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Abstract 
 
On October 22-24, 2003, about 40 experts involved in various aspects of homeland security from 
the United States and four other Pacific region countries meet in Kihei, Hawaii to engage in a 
free-wheeling discussion and brainstorm (a “fest”) of the role that technology could play in 
winning the war on terrorism in the Pacific region.  The result of this exercise is a concise and 
relatively thorough definition of the terrorism problem in the Pacific region, emphasizing the 
issues unique to Island nations in the Pacific setting, along with an action plan for developing 
working demonstrators of advanced technological solutions to these issues.  In this approach, the 
participants were asked to view the problem and their potential solutions from multiple 
perspectives, and then to identify barriers (especially social and policy barriers) to any proposed 
technological solution.  The final step was to create a roadmap for further action.  This roadmap 
includes plans to:  1) create a conceptual monitoring and tracking system for people and things 
moving around the region that would be “scale free”, and develop a simple concept demonstrator;  
2) pursue the development of a system to improve local terrorism context information, perhaps 
through the creation of an information clearinghouse for Pacific law enforcement;  3) explore the 
implementation of a Hawaii based pilot system to explore hypothetical terrorist scenarios and the 
development of fusion and analysis tools to work with this data (Sandia);  and 4) share 
information concerning the numerous activities ongoing at various organizations around the 
understanding and modeling of terrorist behavior.  
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Purpose 
The events of September 11 have dramatically increased the requirements and expectations 
placed on Homeland security, both for the United States and for its allies.  Coastal protection is 
particularly challenging, with many large metropolitan areas located near the oceans.  Islands add 
additional vulnerabilities, with large exposures, remote locations, and limited population relocation 
options.  In general, island infrastructures are less robust than that on the mainland and create 
unique vulnerabilities.  The Pacific region is one of particular concern, both because of its 
significance in American history (think of the impact of a second successful attack on Pearl 
Harbor) and the increasing presence of hostile actors in this area.  How will the US and its allies 
provide protection or respond to an attack on its territories?    The successful defense of this area 
from terrorist attacks will require sensors, information tools, procedures, processes, and, most 
importantly, collaboration between allies.   
 
To further this effort, the Sandia National Laboratories Advanced Concepts Group, the Maui High 
Performance Computing Center, and the Pacific Disaster Center co-hosted this workshop, 
PacFest, which brought together about 40 key players involved in counter-terrorism in the Pacific 
region to discuss how to jointly develop the technologies that would enable effective defensive 
and response measures.   
The PacFest Process  
This “Fest” consisted of two and a half days of intense brainstorming and cataloging of ideas on 
an off-the-record, non-attribution basis.  There was only one formal presentation concerning the 
status of terrorism in the Pacific region, with the remainder of the time spent sharing expertise 
through the small group brainstorm sessions.  The brainstorming sessions sequenced through 
the following six topical sessions: 
I. What is unique about Islands and the Pacific region from the perspective of vulnerabilities, 
from the perspective of the attacker, from the perspective of the defender, and from the 
perspective of designing a hardened infrastructure? 
II. What role could technology play in the war on terrorism in the Pacific region from the 
perspective of 1) an individual trying to detect and interdict a terrorist event, 2) a defender, 
3) a responder, and 4) a person in charge of recovery? 
III. In taking a system view, what is the ideal system that would be required to win the war on 
terrorism?  Here, each group worked to 
create a solution optimized from the 
viewpoint of 1) an interdiction team, 2) a 
defender team, 3) a responder team, and 4) 
a recovery team. 
IV. In session IV, the barriers to achieving this 
vision were collected from the viewpoint of 
1) a private citizen, 2) a business, 3) a 
government, and 4) a non-government 
organization. 
V. In this session, any technology barriers, 
required breakthroughs, and existing 
leverage points were identified. 
VI. The final session developed a roadmap of 
specific actions that would help lead to the 
implementation of some part of this vision. 
 
The process used was a combination of written brainstorming and small group sessions followed 
by large group discussions. The written brainstorms were carried out on large pieces of poster 
paper placed on the wall with the session subtopic identified at each station.  Participants were 
given about 30-45 minutes to move about the room and enter their ideas and react to the ideas of 
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others.  At the end of this time, a facilitator took the poster papers capturing the ideas of the 
larger group and worked with the subgroup to: organize by creating categories and grouping 
ideas; refine by editing, condensing, and clarifying; add new ideas, expand, and enumerate; 
synthesize by combining diverse concepts into a coherent whole; and finally create an outline 
report for the plenary session.  Each group then selected a person to present the plenary report. 
Participation 
The workshop, co-hosted by the Maui High Performance Computing Center, the Pacific Disaster 
Center, and Sandia National Laboratories’ Advanced Concepts Group, was held at the facilities of 
the Maui High Performance Computing Center and the Pacific Disaster Center in Kihei, Hawaii.  
The Sandia Advanced Concepts Group (ACG) has been chartered to develop solutions to future 
national security problems that don't yet exist but are on the horizon. Since September 11, 2001, 
the ACG has focused its efforts toward the "War on Terrorism.”  The Maui High Performance 
Computing Center (MHPCC) is a national supercomputing resource that provides world-class, 
scalable parallel computing capability to the research, science, and war fighter communities.  The 
Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) is a non-government organization (NGO) that provides applied 
research and analysis support for the development of more effective policies, institutions, 
programs, and information products for the disaster management and humanitarian assistance 
communities of the Asia Pacific region and beyond.  The common interest of these institutions in 
the identification and implementation of technology solutions to national security was the genesis 
of this workshop. 
 
PacFest was intended to pull together a small but diverse group of individuals with an interest in 
dealing with terrorism in the Pacific region.  There were participants from four countries besides 
the United States, namely Australia, Singapore, Fiji, and Palau.  The U.S. institutions represented 
in addition to the three hosts included the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Pacific Command, the Navy, the Army, the East-West Center, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Hawaii State Civil Defense Agency, the Center of 
Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, the Hawaii State Department 
of Defense, the Hawaii National Guard, and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, ACS 
Defense, Inc., and ThoughtWeb, Inc. 
 
This report is an attempt to summarize the discussions held in large and small group sessions 
with the intent to capture the key points and opinions of the participants. 
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Unique Issues of Terrorism for the Region   
Most of the unique issues of terrorism in this region identified in the first session revolve around 
the fact that the region consists of many small islands, separated by vast ocean space, with many 
governing bodies and with economies dependent primarily on tourism and agriculture.   
 
From the point of view of the terrorist, these are 
remote locations with highly interdependent 
societies.  There will be no easy escape, for 
example, for victims of a biological attack - 
quarantine might be the best that can be done, 
and resupply after attack will be hard.  It will be 
easy to create panic on an island and attacks here 
could easily cascade to a global impact. 
 
The vulnerabilities for the region are great.  The 
geographic issues drive many concerns.  The 
region consists largely of numerous islands with 
many points for transfer of people and goods.  
Isolation and remoteness will make logistics 
difficult for providing backup/recovery. 
 
The economies are highly dependent on only two industries – tourism and agriculture.  The 
region also has “shadow economies” such as drug trafficking with “charities” possibly used as 
conduits for illegal transfer of money.   
 
There are many strong relationships with 
western institutions, yielding many symbolic 
targets against the West.  Weak 
government structures, government 
corruption and lack of effective laws and 
enforcement of laws for investigation and 
pre-emption of terrorist activities and money 
laundering are concerns.  There is limited 
cooperation between governments, 
especially related to maritime security, and 
security at ports of entry is not very strong.  
Also the region has limited capabilities in 
technology and highly skilled workers.   
 
Defense of the region will need to be adaptable and flexible with international efforts in some 
realms.  It will need to incorporate individuals as well as government institutions and military. The 
challenges are the vulnerabilities in shipping, and 
the lack of a good communications infrastructure for 
the region given the large area to defend with wide 
separation among resources for defense.  The 
institutional and governmental challenges are also 
great – with very different approaches to the 
allocation of resources relative to other national 
priorities.  The use and sharing of intelligence is 
globally problematic – across the boundaries of 
local, state and federal and international agencies –
– but amplified in this region with so many nations of 
varying sizes involved.  The rules of engagement 
are even unclear across this disparate collection of 
nations.  
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From the Responder View, the issues revolve around the geography challenges and the logistics 
problems that these impose in addition to the 
potential for multi-nation coordination in an ad 
hoc environment.  The “tyranny of distance” 
will create obstacles for effective response 
from more than one island.  This drives the 
need for stockpiling in preparation for possible 
events.  Evacuation will likely not be an option 
for small islands so that quarantine is the likely 
response.  With the exception of plans in 
advance for special international events, there 
is no planning for coordinated response in the 
region.  Since time is of the essence in 
effective first response, planning, training and 
standardization of processes are of prime 
importance.  The lack of this kind of planning and commonality of procedures and processes will 
make effective response very difficult to attain. The lack of interoperable communications among 
responders from different nations, technologies, languages and protocols will also limit response.  
The security of responders on foreign soil will also be an issue should multinational response be 
required. 
Role of Technology in Addressing Terrorism 
The second session dealt with the identification of the various roles that technology could play in 
the war on terrorism.   
 
Enabling interdiction will require the use of “special” intelligence sources including signal 
intercepts, imaging, and human intelligence gathered by specified agents, as well as “open” 
sources.  The sharing and classification of this data is a continuing issue between government 
agencies and is even a larger issue across national boundaries.  Realizing multi-level security 
has long been a dream of the information assurance community.  In fact, a risk analysis of the 
impact of NOT sharing data should be included in any study of information security.  Reliable 
machine translation including the unwritten “tone” of a message has not yet been achieved and 
there are no accelerated language learning tools.  Open source data is often difficult to validate 
and the security of the “feeder documents” necessary to obtain key documents such as passports 
is often poor.  Enhanced sensors and sensor networks and advanced platforms that would allow 
for airborne, long-term, long distance sensing are needed.  Technologies to enable effective 
global transaction monitoring with the ability to tag items and monitor their movement is essential.   
 
The development of technologies that would help anticipate terrorists’ traits and prospective 
courses of action received much discussion.  The use of gaming, modeling, and simulation were 
identified as techniques for this task.  Red teaming to explore hypothetical terrorist scenarios and 
the development of fusion and analysis tools to work with this data was identified.  There is also a 
need for better ways to share lessons learned and mistakes made.  The mobilization of the 
proper forces for actual interdiction will hinge on the ability to provide rapid transfer of information 
to the appropriate authorities. 
 
Technology can play a very large role in hardening the infrastructure critical to the 
continuing functioning of our societies. All systems that provide services such as utilities and 
public safety are of concern.  In order to limit cascading failures, understanding the complex 
dependencies between systems through interdependency and risk/vulnerability modeling is 
required.  Mechanisms to quickly isolate failed components, redundant systems, and systems 
that can “auto recover” and adapt are also needed.  Optimizing the “human in the loop”— using 
the appropriate human/technology balance – seems the best way to provide the right level of 
protection since it’s not possible to completely prevent all damage.  The types of technologies 
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that need to be considered are communication and surveillance systems (including health 
surveillance), autonomous remote sensing, cyber security/computer network defense, and better 
data/information systems and analysis.  Systems for tracking movement of people and goods and 
protecting logistics would also be needed.  
The challenges lie in retrofitting existing hardware and 
software, in modify operating procedures, and in getting 
better vulnerability assessment.  For new construction, 
we need up-front vulnerability assessment and 
integration of hardenings feature into the design from the 
beginning. 
 
Since both the infrastructure of a given society and the 
“society” itself must survive and contain the effects of an 
event, there is a need for societal “hardening”, reducing 
the terror of an event when one occurs.  Various institutional activities were identified such as risk 
realization and communication to promote dialogue and debate leading to acceptance of the long-
term nature of the problem.  The standards, formats, and compatible systems should be 
developed to support rapid sharing of information and “red teaming” should be used to test 
effectiveness of various approaches against threat scenarios.  Other measures such as 
psychological hardening, better risk communications methodologies, better communications and 
training, improved behavior understanding, and enhanced feedback to institutions such as 
alternatives to 911 calls could be applied to the general population.   
 
Effective response could be enhanced with technology for communications, command and 
control, situational assessment/awareness aids for first responders, policy and decision support 
and training. Communication systems need an overall plan with contingencies and with sufficient 
redundancy and backup.  Technology could help with locating and accessing indigenous 
response capabilities and provide responders with 
knowledge of communication systems’ resources.  
Technology could help bridge gaps in 
interoperability, both inter-agency and international, 
and help with public awareness communication 
capacity.  Providing power (AC/DC/other) is another 
key issue.  Command and Control Systems 
(national/international) could provide an integrated 
response capability through the creation of a 
common operational picture (COP), and effective 
command, control, and communication (C3).  Key features would include state-of-the-art 
collaboration tools for the formation of virtual teams, effective visualization tools for affected 
buildings giving structure details, “just-in-time” knowledge transfer from domain experts, as well 
as effective resource tracking. 
 
Technology could provide better responder protective equipment and monitoring and tracking of 
response team members, including the ability to assess their physical and mental status and the 
status of their available resources.  Sensors to look through walls, allow remote detection of 
hazardous materials and assess structural integrity (Smart Buildings) would greatly improve 
situational assessment and awareness.  Other valuable technologies would be tools for 
containment and decontamination of biological/chemical/nuclear agents.   Tools for predictive 
modeling of plumes and dispersion of agents would be valuable, and would allow rapid damage 
assessment.  Responder performance could be enhanced with technology for web-based guides, 
training, and certification.  
 
Recovery was defined as the process of “getting back toward ‘normal’”. This could include 
criminal investigation and law enforcement, detection and assessment technologies, 
decontamination of infrastructure / buildings / debris / victims, and protection of the work force. 
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The first challenge will be to make sure that the 
recovery event is not worse than the event itself.  
Communication and effective education are key 
areas where technology could improve support 
of recovery from terrorist activities through 
“distance learning” for Natural Disaster 
Management Offices (NDMO’s), through 
enhanced sharing of best practices, through 
effective use of media and communication 
channels, and through more effective 
information sharing for planning and decision making.  Visualization and Graphic Information 
systems (GIS), modeling and scenario evaluation (including economic processes) and 
“information compression” to enable wider dissemination under limited communication bandwidth 
are key technology drivers.  Technology in conjunction with social processes to help determine 
“how clean is clean enough” will be critical as well as improved models for long-term socio-
economic impact assessment.  Consideration of both environmental recovery and strategic 
economic recovery are important.  Technologies for rapid deployment of power and water through 
small, expendable drop-in structures would be useful.  Overall, the assessment was that better 
technologies could make recovery safer, cheaper, and more effective. 
Ideal Systems for Combating Terrorism  
Having considered the unique challenges for the region and the general role of technology in this 
problem space, the workshop participants broke into four smaller groups to generate visions of an 
ideal system for compacting terrorism in the region, optimized for the focus of their particular 
group assignment.  The essence of each ideal system is described below. 
Interdiction Team  
At the policy level, an increased appreciation and understanding of Asian culture and languages 
is needed.   Ideally, a communication plan aimed at getting our story clearly communicated in the 
region and helping us to understand the opposing message would be developed.  This could also 
be used to help our society better differentiate real risk from general fear. 
A system was envisioned that consisted of: 
• a global transaction and travel tracking system, 
using sensors for tracking chemical, biological, 
nuclear hazards and explosives, 
• a DNA based database for tracking people 
linked to travel documents, and  
• a system that stores red team data and 
hypothesizes possible futures that can link to 
these tracking systems,  
so that upon sufficient data matching, appropriate 
international organizations can be notified for a 
coordinated response.   
This system would flag NULL data and discontinuities and manage HUMINT (intelligence gathered by 
human agents) data efficiently. System abuse would be controlled by two-way transparency.  This tool 
would both push and pull data but would push data when needed based on knowledge of what 
information the user had.   This system would also be used to establish collaboration across countries 
using multiple languages, creating in essence a virtual global intelligence agency.   
The final element of this ideal system would be an automated critical infrastructure protection 
system to place segments of the infrastructure in protection mode when attack mechanisms are 
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sensed.   This dynamic and evolving system would need to have tools for trend projection and 
would be tuned to detect deceptions and insider attacks. 
Hardening Society and its Infrastructure against Attack  
The basic need is the creation of an environment in which terrorism cannot flourish. 
The ideal approach to this would be to establish a regional security franchise.  If developed 
properly it would provide a scale-free solution through the use of simple building blocks that are 
locally customizable within global standards.  The features of the basic system would involve 
border monitoring of people and goods with advanced information assurance techniques for 
documents and automated review of those documents at borders.  This system would use 
biometrics and smart cards for identification and tracking of people, and tags and seals for 
containers to identify and track hazardous materials.  Documents would be automatically 
reviewed and verified with advanced integrity and information assurance techniques.  Materials 
and vehicles could be monitored remotely.  
 
A better understanding of the intentions of terrorist actors could be facilitated by developing tools 
that would model behavior and operations.  These would be part of the franchised analysis and 
warning toolkits.  These systems would be locally customized but designed within global 
specifications to allow efficient sharing of information globally - leading to knowledge and alerts 
worldwide.  A side benefit of this system would be improved communications among these 
nations as well as improved surveillance for health and local security unrelated to terrorism. 
  
The implementation approach suggested by this group was very important – defining key features 
with a top down view but with bottom up enhancements.  The expandability of this system would 
be assured through consistent implementation. 
Responder View  
The ideal system involved 4 aspects – diplomatic, regional systems for intelligence, improved 
border security at all levels of “borders”, and enhanced tools for responders. 
An Island States Security Initiative or treaty organization 
should be created, overseen, and coordinated by 
INTERPOL and funded through an international 
appeal.  This organization would provide a common 
operating picture on security and terrorism.   It would 
facilitate the sharing of strategies, security issues 
(including legal, law enforcement, defense, and public 
awareness), as well as achievements and successes of 
regional states in combating the spread of terror.  A 
side benefit will be improvements in the fight against 
international criminal activities. 
An information technology system, operating at the sensitive but unclassified level, should be 
developed to address terrorism concerns of the members of this initiative.  This system could be 
maintained by INTERPOL or another regional organization.  The larger states could share intelligence 
as required, while other states could provide trainers and assistance in operating local nodes. This 
system would provide at a minimum, common customs and immigration databases, and maritime 
shipping and smuggling databases.  It could track known sea and air routes for rogue ships and planes 
using satellites and other imaging technologies.   The system could provide profiles of likely threat 
groups and individuals and trends in terrorist activities.  
A virtual wall for border security could be developed, applicable to land, sea and air “borders”.  It would 
be used for people or cargo, using standoff layered multiple sensors (visual, thermal, CBRNE) 
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embedded in facilities and routine structures.  This wall would be interconnected with other systems 
and agencies.  The use of “fingerprints” of people and materials, natural or induced (electronic, 
chemical) as part of badging or containers and in conjunction with information security (making these 
difficult to alter yet easily authenticated) would be essential elements of the Virtual Wall system. 
Finally, the protective gear for first responders should be much more adaptable than it is today.  This 
gear should use materials which can change their protective properties once the nature of the 
hazardous environment is described or sensed. 
Recovery Vision 
The ideal system would be a multi-national, inter-agency, synchronized system to defeat terrorism and 
designed with multi-cultural/multi-national/multi-domain requirements to deter, respond and recover 
from terrorist acts.  This system would involve people and machines, in a scalable system that is 
reliable, redundant, and deployable, with mobile, cheap and interoperable sub-elements. The data for 
this system should come from multiple sources, tagged for appropriate release and use.  It would use 
standardized protocols and standardized forms, especially for field-collected data.  The presentation for 
this information must include geospatial and temporal aspects to provide a regional situation 
awareness and “common operating picture”.  
Modeling, analysis, and simulation of terrorist networks and critical infrastructure networks would be an 
essential element of this system.  It would allow for scenario evaluation and course of action decisions 
as well as post-action assessment and training.  Sensors that are quick and easy to deploy, built to 
interoperability standards would support decision makers in Emergency Operation Centers.  
International (multi- and bi-lateral) cooperation for response and recovery would result in standards for 
tools and operations and training for counter terrorism and WMD response and recovery teams.  It 
would also facilitate shared use of facilities and equipment in crisis response.  
The Combined Ideal System 
The common themes of the four subgroup recommendations were coalesced into the following two 
system concepts for combating terrorism in the region. 
 
A system for monitoring and tracking of information, vessels, goods and people that would be  
• Regionally deployed 
• Locally customized 
• Globally interoperable 
• Scale-free  
• Layered 
with automated alerts and forwarding of information and with flows to interdiction and response 
agencies. 
  
A system to provide better understand the enabling environment for terrorism in the region to: 
• understand the status of terrorism, extremism, political violence  
• develop technologies to help focus regional knowledge and expertise on counter terrorism 
• develop tools or applications to lower information sharing barriers (e.g. language) 
leading to better strategic decisions and public support, resources, and institutions.  
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Challenges and Opportunities  
The challenges to achieving the “ideal” solution were divided into five sections, four focusing on 
the “social” barriers as viewed by an individual citizen, as viewed by a business, as viewed by a 
government, and from the view of a non-government organization (NGO), and a final section on 
technology barriers and leverage points. 
 
From the citizen perspective, the first barrier will be the fear that the money to pay for these 
technologies will come from the diversion of funds from other needed programs such as 
education and health.  The second set of barriers will stem from concern around privacy and civil 
liberties.  Questions such as: 
• Can I, as a citizen, trust the government (or, if I’m not a 
US citizen, trust a US developed solution) to use the 
system for its intended purpose and only its intended 
purpose?   
• Will the system try to change or not respect our culture?   
• Will it destroy out Island traditions of tolerance?   
• Will the system somehow facilitate corruption in 
government?   
The final barrier identified will be the tendency for the average 
citizen to deny the danger or to believe that this system would really make them safer. 
 
For those involved in commerce, the major concern was the cost of doing business.   
 
• Would this system slow down commerce, increase 
taxes, or have increase compliance costs?  
• Would it decrease my access to (cheap) labor?  
 
This system could require business strategy changes that 
could increase start-up business costs, especially in 
developing countries, or reduce the benefits of globalization.  
There could also be concern about data security for these 
systems. In particular, business would want assurances that 
competitors will not get access to proprietary data or gain a 
competitive edge through data access.  They would also be concerned that government will use 
this data for audits or compliance checks in addition to detecting terrorism. 
 
From a government perspective, issues will again arise around money; specifically how the 
money for these systems will be raised.  There will be the 
tendency to have these funds distributed through “pork 
barrel” politics.  The debate will rage about whether or not 
we really have a “threat” worth spending resources.  There 
will be political issues around fear of electorate alienation 
because of citizen concerns about these systems.   Also, 
improved international and agency relationships will have 
to be developed respecting sovereignty of nations and 
working through current bureaucratic cultures and the 
historical international environment of mistrust.  Finally, the 
whole subject of information sharing with its associated 
legal/policy issues, agency/organizational cultures, and 
information security and controls present huge barriers to 
major changes.  In most cases, small Island nations feel that information sharing is not an 
equitable, two-way street with the United States. 
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The major concern for non-government organizations will be that governments will be focusing 
money on the wrong place.  They will also be concerned that these systems would affect their 
institutional and cultural operational 
styles.  NGO’s are typically very 
suspicious of governments, especially 
the military, and would fear that they 
would be adversely affected by 
association with governments in these 
systems.   In general, NGO’s fear 
systems that might compromise their 
independence, effectiveness, or 
security in any way. 
 
Technology barriers and required technology breakthroughs largely fell into information and 
computing or sensing and tagging areas with a few outliers.  
 
In information/computing, barriers were 
identified as available bandwidth (especially for 
smaller islands) and storage with more than 
peta-byte systems required.  Information 
assurance was felt to not be up to the challenge, 
with authentication, confidentiality, and the 
availability of information an issue.  The 
question of the possible need for multilevel 
security systems to NSA standards was raised, 
especially in the context of a multinational effort 
(which may require more even more levels), as 
was the extreme difficulty of achieving any NSA 
system approval.  The need for better language tools for translation, natural language processing 
and better technologies for teaching languages was identified.  The challenge of effectively 
extracting knowledge from information will require extensive research in data mining, context 
extraction, and pattern recognition.  In general, the whole problem of managing and analyzing 
large volumes of data is not yet solved.  Other problems included the lack of a common operating 
environment and of common standards/protocols.  The high cost of software development must 
be considered as a possible barrier.  The barriers involved in the development of mathematical 
models that adequately depict terrorism network and resources are enormous, with large multi-
disciplinary efforts needed to develop the social cultural modeling (with possible predictive 
capability) that is desired.  Finally, there will be a need for improved technologies to detect, 
intercept, and exploit communications. 
 
For sensing/tagging, the lack of non-destructive, standoff detection technologies for explosives 
and BCNRE was identified as a barrier.  Inexpensive technologies for biometric detection such as 
DNA to identify people and for clandestinely marking or tagging mobile targets are needed.  The 
development of tamper proof containers for shipping and reliable, inexpensive technology to 
detect, track, and classify small boats from a distance would also be of high value.  Effective 
robotics have not been adequately developed to place sensors into areas difficult or dangerous 
for human access.  Finally, nano technologies with improved engineering to rapidly and cheaply 
manufacture large numbers of small things must be developed.  
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There are many leverage points where existing programs and capabilities could be used to 
rapidly prototype some of these concepts.  The ability to build standard web based interfaces 
provides a valuable starting point for any multi-national systems. We can build on the informal, 
unofficial multilateral development of standard process (MPAT) and collaborative sites for 
Civilian-Military Operations (APAN’s CMOC).  
There are also existing videoconferencing facilities 
and more ability to videoconference using 
standard IP Internet protocols.  The ASCI program 
continues to fund new parallel systems with 
enormous computing capability.  Existing marine 
surveillance customs and immigration systems, 
the Navy’s perimeter defense systems, which are 
under development, many existing information 
sources (open sources) and emerging counter 
terrorism centers can be utilized.  Sandia is 
working with the intelligence community on 
expanded red teaming concepts and on the 
development of a “hypothesizer” engine to manage and reconstruct the hypothetical space within 
which a terrorist act could occur.  In the area of terrorism organization modeling, there are 
significant activities underway at PACOM (JIACG, J08 led initiative), Sandia, DTRA, MCCDC 
(Project Albert), among others. 
 
Several generic leveraging concepts were also identified.  For example, industry is leading the 
charge for security in some areas and might be very interested in cargo tracking systems, which 
could increase performance, reduce inventory losses, and have other commercial benefits.  It 
was noted that by putting counter terrorism into a broader context of improving quality of life might 
allow the leveraging of other funding. Finally the types of multi-national efforts suggested in this 
workshop can create opportunities for positive collaboration between US and other governments. 
Recommendations for Action  
The participants agreed that following actions should be taken as a result of PacFest: 
  
The concept for a monitoring and tracking system described in the system solutions should be 
piloted.  The approach suggested was multi-phased: 
1. A white paper describing the features and approaches for development will be written.  
This will start with a requirements description from Michael Rosenthal of Palau.  This will 
be forwarded to the participants and additions and refinements will be made. 
2. This white paper will be presented at an appropriate international forum for refinement, 
interest and buy-in.  John Reitz will investigate the Western Pacific Naval Symposium or 
the North Pacific Coast Guard.   
3. Sandia and the Pacific Disaster Center will look for a way to investigate the technical 
architectures for a “scale free” approach.   
4. Identify funding agent(s) for the development of a concept demonstrator. 
5. Develop a simple concept demonstration and use a specific country or situation for initial 
testing and refinement. 
6. Migrate the demonstration to selected pilot sites – Albuquerque? Palau? Perth? 
 
In order to make progress on the recommendations for better understanding of the enabling 
environment for terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region: 
• Paul Smith-will draft a concept paper on improving local terrorism context information and 
the clearinghouse approach.   
• Judy Moore-will send a Sandia white paper on “Know-Net” to the PacFest group.    
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Improved technologies for language translation are needed to facilitate collaborations within the 
region.  John Reitz will draft specifications on machine translations. (Refer to work at Johns 
Hopkins University Center for Language and Speech Processing). 
 
Chris Murray will initiate a brief concept paper 
about a system to determine what an individual 
using a system knows, and probes to make the 
individual aware of what they need to learn, then 
pushes the right information to them. 
 
During the workshop, several related efforts were 
discussed and ideas for leveraging these were 
developed: 
• Create a pilot project around red teaming 
for Hawaii to feed the hypothesizer being 
explored by Sandia. John Whitley and 
Mike McCurdy will explore this. 
• Information needs to flow about modeling of terrorist behaviors by DTRA, PACOM, 
Sandia, and the U.S. Marines.  
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Protection 
Paul Smith Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) 
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Agenda  
Tuesday, October 21  
1800 – 2000 Evening Dinner Social & Jumpstart for Discussions 
Tables discuss the “What are the unique terrorism vulnerabilities for this region?” and “What are 
the operational disadvantages and advantages for terrorist activity?”  
Wednesday, October 22 
0800 - 0830          Check-in, Continental Breakfast 
0830 - 0900       Welcome, PAC Fest Purpose and Administrative Details 
0900 - 1000 Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific Region - Backdrop and Context for the 
Brainstorming Sessions  
Break 
1015 - 1030 Overview of the Agenda and Discussion of Brainstorming Rules  
Session I - Unique Terrorism Issues for the Pacific Region 
1030 – 1100 Written Brainstorm 
Collecting ideas for these subtopics: 
• What are the unique terrorism vulnerabilities for this region? 
• What are the operational disadvantages and advantages for terrorist 
activity?  
• What are the unique disadvantages and advantages from the defender 
perspective? 
• What are the unique issues in response & consequence management? 
1100- 1200 Sub-Group Sessions 
Organize, refine, add, synthesize and create a report for the plenary session 
1200 - 1330  Plenary Session & Working Lunch -  
Reports from each group and coalesce to create a unified view 
Session II - The Role of Technology in Fighting Terrorism in the Pacific Region 
1330 – 1400 Written Brainstorm 
Collecting ideas for these subtopics: 
• Enabling early interdiction of terrorist plots 
• Hardening society and infrastructures  
• Enabling effective response to terrorist acts. 
• Reducing time and cost of recovery 
1400 – 1530 Sub-Group Sessions   
Organize, refine, add, synthesize and create a report for the plenary session 
Break   
1545 - 1700 Plenary Session  
Reports from each group and coalesce to create a unified view 
Thursday, October 23  
0800 - 0830 Check-in, Continental Breakfast 
Session III - The System View to Winning the Game 
0830 - 1030 Sub-Group Sessions   
Four groups – each work to develop a vision of the ideal system – but 
optimized from an assigned perspective:   
• understanding what is unfolding,  
• hardening society and its infrastructures against attack,  
• enabling quick and effective response to attack, and  
• reducing the cost and time for recovery from an attack. 
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Break 
1045 – 1230 Plenary Session  
Reports from each group and coalesce to create a unified view 
1230 – 1400 Lunch -Free time 
Session IV - The Social Barriers to This Vision 
1400 – 1430 Written Brainstorm 
Collecting ideas on the barriers to our ideal system from the following perspectives: 
• Citizen (Culture & Family) 
• Commerce (Economics)  
• Government (Politics) 
• Non-government agencies 
1430 – 1530  Plenary Session 
 Large group discussion to refine and create a unified view 
Break 
Session V - Technology Challenges, Breakthroughs, and Leverage Points 
1545 – 1615 Written Brainstorm  
 Collecting ideas on: 
• Technology barriers  
• Required technology breakthroughs and synergies  
• Current activities to leverage 
1615-1700 Plenary Session - Large group discussion of these technology issues 
Friday, October 24 
0800 – 0830  Check-in, Continental Breakfast 
Closeout Session – Path to the Ideal System 
0800-0915 Written Brainstorm of Roadmap 
Bringing all of the ideas together to develop the plan forward 
0915-1100 Group discussion, summary, and action items 
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6. “Terrorism:  Concepts, Causes, And Conflict Resolution”, Advanced Systems and 
Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Working Group on War, 
Violence and Terrorism Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason 
University, http://www.dtra.mil/about/organization/terrorism.doc 
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